News
of the U.K. withdrawal (“Brexit”) from the European Union drove
the Dow Industrial Average down 611 points, but that was just the tip
of the iceberg. More unsettling news is on the way on economic,
political and social fronts. Events will be startling, severe and global.
France's
president Hollande is losing support among the public, according to
polls. Meanwhile, Marine Le Pen, leader of the opposition National
Front political party, is gaining in the polls, which show she would
easily get more votes than Hollande if the election were held today. She has
stated that if she wins the April election she will immediately call
for a referendum on a “Frexit,” that is, whether France should
withdraw from the European Union.
In
the long period leading up to the vote on the Brexit, the “stay in”
voters held a comfortable lead over the “leave” voters until nearly the
very end. An important factor—perhaps the decisive one—in the
Brexit vote was increased concern the country was losing its
“Britishness” because of the influx of Syrian immigrants. The EU
policy calls from free movement of people across the borders of the
individual countries. No need for passports. France has taken in far more
Syrians than the U.K., and Hollande has stated his country will
accept 30,000 of them, which is not likely to help him politically.
After the terrorist attack in Nice, France, in July that
killed 84 people, the polling gap between Le Pen and Hollande
widened. Sixty-one
percent of the French now have an unfavorable view of the EU.
Brexit
has compounded the strains on Europe's banks and Italy's in
particular. “Brexit could lead to a full-blown banking crisis in
Italy,” says Lorenzo Codogno, former director general of the
Italian Treasury. A Frexit would add momentum for an Italian exit
from the EU. But even before the Brexit, Europe was facing a looming
banking crisis in Italy, which has $400 billion in bad loans, nearly
18% of the nation's loans. That is nearly ten times the level in the
U.S., where even in the worst of the 2008-09 crisis, the level was
only about 5%. Italian banks have nearly half of all the bad loans
in the entire 19-nation euro zone.
In
the crisis of 2008, Italian banks were inclined to roll over loans of
delinquent borrowers and hope an economic recovery would rescue the
borrowers and the banks. It didn't happen. Impaired loans are now
quadruple the 2008 level—and still rising. On July 29, 2016, the
European Banking Authority disclosed the result of stress tests on 51
euro zone banks. Italy's Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena—the oldest
bank in the world (since 1472) and the nation's third
largest—finished dead last. The EBA concluded that bank would be
wiped out if the global economy and markets were strained. The EBA
test did not factor in negative interest rates or the effect of
Brexit. Also, it didn't include any Portuguese or Greek banks and
left out some of the smaller unprofitable Italian banks. So
the situation is really worse than the stress test showed.
Germany
is the largest economy in the euro zone, followed by France and
Italy. United Kingdom, which had been in the number two spot, is
already gone. If France and Italy leave, the
euro zone will have lost three of its four largest members. That will
likely spell the end of the European Union. Dissatisfaction with the
EU is already growing in various other member countries. Recent polls
in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands show almost 50% of their
populations have negative views of the EU. In Austria, polls show
anti-EU candidate Norbert Hofer has an edge in October's presidential
election. And Greece probably will not be able to remain in the euro
zone for long, said Alan Greenspan in a recent CNBC interview—a
conclusion that certainly doesn't surprise me or anyone who has read
my latest book. Greece now has a debt of 320
billion euros ($362 billion), about 175 percent of gross domestic
product, and no one wants to lend that country any more money, having
been disappointed by three bailouts already.
While
banking problems are most severe in Italy, other banks in Europe and
elsewhere too, have their problems largely because of the stupid
policy of negative interest rates. Banks are in business to make a
profit by making loans at a higher rate than they pay depositors for
use of their money. When loans are made cheap by increasing the
supply of money (quantitative easing) or negative interest rates, bank profits plummet. In the second quarter 2016,
profits at the British bank HSBC, Europe's biggest lender, dropped
45% from a year earlier. At Santander, Spain's largest bank, the drop
was 50%. And at Deutschebank, Germany's largest bank, profits
plummeted 98%.
Not surprisingly, the decline in banking profits has been reflected in the banks' stock prices. The shares of Italy's largest bank, UniCredit, have lost nearly 70% of their value. Shares of the Royal Bank of Scotland has declined more than 55%, and those of Credit Suisse and Barclays are down by half. Since the start of 2016, twenty of the world's bigger banks have lost about $455 billion, a quarter of their combined market value.
Not surprisingly, the decline in banking profits has been reflected in the banks' stock prices. The shares of Italy's largest bank, UniCredit, have lost nearly 70% of their value. Shares of the Royal Bank of Scotland has declined more than 55%, and those of Credit Suisse and Barclays are down by half. Since the start of 2016, twenty of the world's bigger banks have lost about $455 billion, a quarter of their combined market value.
Bank
leverage is the a proportion of a bank's debts to its equity/capital.
Deutsche Bank has leverage of 40 times. By comparison, Lehman Bros.
had leverage of only 31 times when it imploded in 2008, setting off
the global banking crisis.
The
European Central Bank has assets of $3.5 trillion on its balance
sheet, according to Yardeni Research Inc.'s June 2016 Global
Economic Briefing: Central Bank Balance Sheets. In
addition, the ECB is committed to purchasing another 80 billion of
euro assets every month until March 2017 (which might be extended) in
European sovereign bonds and corporate bonds, including junk bonds.
However, ECB's capital, which determines its solvency is a mere $12.2
billion. If the ECB were a “real” bank, its leverage would be
almost 287.
Deutsche
Bank's chief executive John Cryan has warned
of
the "fatal consequences" of the European Central Bank's
negative interest rate policy, which he said punishes savers
and is “working against the goals of strengthening the economy and
making the European banking system safer.” He said low interest
rates have dire implications for savers and pension plans. In
fact, according to insurance giant Swiss Re, the U.S. Federal
Reserve's low interest rates cost savers $470 billion in forsaken
interest income between 2008 and 2013. It calculates that by the end
of 2016 savers, retirees and pension funds will be shortchanged $752
billion.
Since
the ECB introduced negative interest rates in 2014, the euro has lost
18% of its value. Worldwide there are now $13 trillion of government
bonds with negative interest rates. More than 90% of Japanese
government bonds have negative yields, as do about 84% of German
government bonds.
In
a 12-page damning
analysis,
Deutsche Bank compared the European Central Bank's mistakes to those
made by the German Reichsbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve in the
1920s, which eventually helped lead the U.S. into the Great
Depression. "That was a hundred years ago,” the report said,
“but mistakes keep happening despite all the supposed improvements
to central banking, from independence to better data and more
sophisticated theoretical and econometric models."
The
mistakes keep happening because those theoretical and econometric
models are fundamentally wrong. They are based on Keynesian
economics—which means they are not economic at all; they are
anti-economic. As Professor Robert Barro—who has studied
Keynesianism extensively—put it: “The Keynesian model asks one to
turn economic common sense on its head in many ways.”
Hunter
Lewis, author of the book Where
Keynes Went Wrong
writes: “Keynes suggested that the government could print new
money. That money would flow into the economy in the form of debt,
and that would take the place of savings, but there is just no
evidence for that at all, there is no logic behind that. In fact, if
you want a good economy, what you need is savings, and you need to
invest savings in a wise way...Of course, Keynes completely ignores
the issue of how you are investing. For him, not
only is any investment equivalent to any other investment, but
spending is equivalent to investment.”
He believed, said
Professor Barro, that “more government spending is good even if it
goes to wasteful projects.” Of course, it is not promoted as
wasteful spending; instead it is called stimulus spending.
Keynes
claimed government spending created a multiplier effect as that money
was, in turn, spent over and over again throughout the economy. The
Obama administration based its massive stimulus spending program on a
multiplier of 1.5, meaning that every dollar of government spending
would lead to a $1.5 increase in the GDP. But Lewis says, “There
is just no evidence” that spending ever cured a recession, and
Keynes “wasn't particularly interested in evidence.” Professor
Barro says,
"What few know is that there is no meaningful theoretical or
empirical support for the Keynsian position.” In my book, second edition, I cite several academic studies proving this point. For
example, a study by Barro and Charles Redlick found a multiplier
effect of 0.4 to 0.7. A study by economics professor Gerald W.
Scully covering sixty years of data found a multiplier of 0.46. When
the multiplier is less than 1.0, it shows a negative effect: the
benefits are less than their cost. I
also include a graph (which I showed as Figure 2 here
on
this blog in June) showing the Obama stimulus act worsened—rather
than reduced—the unemployment rate. The U.S. economy would have
done better if the government had done nothing, rather than
attempting to stimulate it.
There
is extensive evidence that Keynsian policies of Franklin Roosevelt
prolonged the Great Depression rather than curing it. And the same
faulty doctrine has produced two “lost decades” of economic
growth in Japan, which is now well into its third such substandard
decade, while fear of a depression is growing. Nevertheless, Obama
has been implementing the same failed doctrine throughout his
presidency, and it has produced the weakest recovery from any U.S.
recession since 1949.
The
stock market today is one of the few economic aspects that some view
as positive because stock prices have held up, but this requires
further inspection. According to Goldman Sachs, buybacks have been
the biggest driver of stock prices since the financial crisis.
Companies have spent $2.5 trillion on “share buybacks” since
then. A buyback is when a company buys back its stock from
shareholders. This reduces the number of shares on the market and
raises a company's earnings per share, which makes the company look
good—it may pay a higher dividend—and may lift its stock price,
but it doesn't make a company any more profitable. Low interest
rates have allowed companies to borrow cheaply to buy their shares,
as opposed to expending capital on business improvements, hiring and
growing earnings.
Basically,
rising stock prices correlate to higher earnings or the expectation
of higher earnings; and if earnings are disappointing, stock prices
will adjust accordingly. Here are some facts that indicate the high
level of stock prices is out of whack with economic realities—and
are due for a sharp downward adjustment:
- The Standard & Poor's 500 index now has a P/E (price/earnings ratio) of 25. Only twice in history has this metric been this high: (1) at the top of the high-tech (“dot.com”) bubble that burst in 2000, and (2) in 2007 at the peak of the stock market before it and the housing/mortgage market collapsed into the Great Recession of 2008-09.
- Earnings have moved in the opposite direction from stock prices. Earnings for the S&P 500 peaked in 2014 at $106 per share. Corporate earning for those same companies have declined for four straight quarters, and the end of the second quarter 2016 stood at $86.67 per share. This despite the fact that the Dow Industrials and the S&P 500 hit all-time highs in August.
- Business investment fell 2.2% last quarter, the third straight quarterly decline in investments in property, plant and equipment, which hasn't happened since 2008-09.
- U.S. companies are borrowing faster than they did during the dot-com bubble or housing boom.
- Corporate leverage, which measures net debt against earnings, is twice as high as it was in 2007.
- The real GDP growth rate for the year ending in June was a mere 1.2%—the weakest four-quarter rate since the Great Recession.
The
stock market is thus very vulnerable in its own economic terms, but a
major collapse here could also be triggered by an outside event such
as a Frexit. Remember the 611 point drop in the Dow Industrials
after the Brexist. After a Frexit, there won't be an immediate
rebound as happened then, because there will still be the specter of
an Italian banking crisis and the likelihood of Italy also exiting
the EU.
It
is also possible that Italy will take the lead in exiting the euro
zone rather than France, not just because of its banking problems but
because of a referendum in October or November. The current prime
minister Matteo Renzi, who has pursued reforms, is risking his future
on a referendum over badly-needed constitutional changes. He says he
will resign if the referendum fails. A “no”vote will not only
bring about the downfall of his government but throw Italy's
membership in the eurozone in doubt. If Renzi is gone, it is quite
likely other parties will call for a vote on whether Italy should
stay in the EU.
Another
possible trigger for a stock market collapse and the fall of other
economic dominoes could be the Fed instituting negative interest
rates to try to “stimulate” (ha!) economic growth after a series
of increasingly negative economic reports. That would be the final
nail in the coffin of economic growth. It would reduce the available
money supply in the banking system because people will simply
withdraw money from their accounts and hide it under a mattress or
equivalents. Even Commerzbank, the second largest bank in Germany,
says it is considering
storing cash in its own vaults to avoid paying the negative interest
storage costs at the European Central Bank.
The
aim of negative interest rates was to induce people to spend more and
save less, on the faulty assumption this would improve the economy.
It has produced the opposite effect. Central banks in Japan,
Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland have adopted negative interest rates;
but consumers in all those countries are saving more. They are
looking out for their own future and want to replace lost interest
income from savings and retirement accounts, not spend more. And
banks in some countries, such as Switzerland, have responded to
negative rates by making mortgage borrowing more expensive, not less
as had been hoped.
Since
the formation of the EU in the 1990s, there has been a concerted
political effort to phase out gold in the international monetary
system and replace it with a fiat currency, the euro. The euro
experience has shown that an unlimited ability to print money with no
backing cannot replace the effectiveness of a tangible monetary
asset, gold. It may be useful, therefore, to look at the history of
the EU's agreements on gold.
The
first Central Bank Gold Agreement took place in 1999. At that time,
central banks held nearly a quarter of all gold held above ground,
about 33,000 tonnes. The second gold agreement (GBA2) took place in
2004. CBA3 and CBA4 followed in 2009 and 2014. The first clause in
each of these four agreements began: “Gold
will remain an important element of global monetary reserves.” In
one of its first pronouncements, the ECB governing council decided
the capital subscriptions of eurozone members would be paid 15% in
gold and 85% in dollars or Japanese yen. (The capital subscriptions were based
on population and GDP of the members.)
In
a speech at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in October 2013,
Mario Draghi, head of the ECB and responsible for printing huge
quantities of fiat euro, said,
there are “several reasons” to own gold, among them “as a
reserve of safety.” At the close of 2015, the world's centrals bank
held about 31,400 tonnes of gold. The ECB held 503.2 tonnes, while
national central banks held the rest. In 2014 the central banks
bought 477 tonnes, the second highest amount in 50 years. In 2015
they bought 588 tonnes.
In
the many centuries since the Chinese invented paper, there have been
some 3,400 fiat paper currencies. All of them became worthless.
There are no exceptions. The record is perfect failure: 100 per
cent. The
dollar will eventually become totally worthless, too. It may be a
tossup whether the euro will get there first.
The
rising gold price—and the fact that the central banks not only have
thousands of tons of gold but are increasingly adding to it—shows a
concern for safety and stability of money as a store of value. People
throughout the world have the same concern and been increasing their
buying of gold. Gold has answered the need for a store of value for
5,000 years. Quantitative easing and negative interest rates have
never done so. Indeed, negative interest rates are unknown in 5,000
years of history.
However
this issue plays out, gold will win in the end—because it best
exemplifies the realities of the natural requirements of money—and
its price will be much higher than it is today.